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Riste and Ristedari:  





Based on the author’s long standing ethnographic experience of  developments with Punjabi 
ethnic colonies in the UK as well as their members’ villages of origin in India and Pakistan, 
together with the additional insight which he has gathered in the course of preparing over 
250 expert reports for use in civil, criminal and immigration proceedings in UK courts – the 
vast majority of which were in some way concerned with issues of kinship and marriage – 
this chapter seeks to trace the role which marital ties have played in facilitating the process 
of South Asian migration to Britain. Arguing that affinal ties are at least as significant of 
those of descent in the construction of transnational networks ‘from below’, the paper also 
explores the far reaching impact which variations in marriage rules have had on the 
evolution of such networks, as well as on the location and character of patterns personal 
distress which can also be experiences by those involved in transnational marriages. It 
concludes by suggesting that ‘the devil is in the detail’, and that when those involved in such 
marriages find themselves in severe distress, the difficulties they encounter are invariably 
much better understood as the outcome of the micro-politics of interpersonal relationships 
within the spouses immediate kinship networks than of the phenomenon of transnational 
marriage per se.  
 
 
Kinship reciprocities have played a major facilitating role in almost every large-scale process 
of transnational migration, as well as in the processes of ethnic colony construction to which 
these processes regularly give rise. It is not difficult to see why Whilst the very earliest 
pioneers of such movements usually washed up – sometimes quite literally – at their 
destination as a result of exposure to unexpected contingencies way beyond their personal 
control, the vast majority of those who followed in their footsteps had a much better 
appreciation of just where they were going. Hence most migrants make their way to their 
chosen destination because they have prior knowledge of the opportunities available there, 
and because information about the existence of those opportunities and the best way to reach 
them has been passed back through channels of kinship, friendship and clientship from earlier 
predecessors who have already begun to establish a toehold in some distant niche. As a result 
what may seem at first sight to be mass migratory movements invariably turn out, on closer 
inspection, to be grounded in multitude of kin- and locality-specific processes of chain 
migration which together have had the effect of delivering large numbers of migrant workers 
from relatively poverty-stricken areas in the rural periphery into labour-hungry industries in 
the metropolitan core (Gardner 1995, Helweg 1986, Shaw 1988, Watson 1975, Werbner 
1987).  
 
Much of my own work on emigration of Indian and Pakistani Punjab (Ballard 1975, 1982, 
1983, 1988, 1990, 1994, 2004) has focused on the dynamics of such processes of chain 
migration, and as my understanding of the dynamics of these processes has developed, on the 
far reaching impact which the specific character of the kinship conventions (and most 
especially of the marriage rules) has had in structuring the differential dynamics of processes 
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of migration, the precise way in which ethnic colonies and developed, and the distinctive 
character of transnational networks which members of each set of migrants have constructed 
around themselves. However having reviewed the arguments and analyses which I and other 
commentators so far produced, I have grown acutely conscious that I have as yet paid far too 
little attention to the gendered dimensions of these processes, and in particular to the 
immense significance of the affinal ties generated by marriage. This article sets out to restore 
the balance.  
 
That accounts of migration processes – and most especially those focussing on emigration 
from northern India and Pakistan – should initially have focused primarily on male is hardly 
surprising. Given the strongly patrilineal and patriarchal character of kinship conventions in 
this region, the obstacles faced by any woman seeking to engage in spatial entrepreneurship 
were enormous: with the exception of families drawn from the upper echelons of the urban 
elite, the prospect of a lone woman taking up employment at some distant destination was 
viewed regarded as scandalous. Moreover even in regions where it was regarded as more 
acceptable for women to do as – as for example in Kerala, Sri Lanka, and the Philippines – 
the demand for female labour at lower end of the international employment market was very 
limited.  
 
However in recent years opportunities for women to set off as migrant workers in their own 
right have increased by leaps and bounds. Just like the niches into which their male 
counterparts initially stepped, these were largely restricted to the menial sector of the labour 
market, albeit with a feminine twist: hence whilst nursing stood at the top end of the scale of 
the opportunities available, the rest fell swiftly down the scale through care assistants, maids 
and cleaners, with sex work right at the bottom. As it happens, however, very few women 
belonging to the Punjabi communities of which I have direct empirical experience took up the 
opportunity to become labour migrants in their own right, with the result that I have not 
attempted to discuss the experiences of women who moved directly into any of the 
occupations listed above in this paper. Instead I have focussed my concern on the many 
gendered subtexts which have emerged within – and which in doing so often powerfully 
qualified – the organisation of a set of transnational networks in which male migrants 
nominally occupied a position of unchallenged hegemonic dominance.  
Marriage, patrilinearity and female agency 
In contexts where kinship networks are as strongly patrilineal as they are patriarchal in 
character, it is all too easy to underestimate the scope for female agency, as well as the 
significance of processes of affinally- as opposed to agnatically-oriented kinship reciprocity. 
It easy to see why. In cultural contexts in which gender hierarchies are sharply marked, where 
the normative subordination of women to men is taken for granted, and where conventions of 
sharam and purdah but substantial limits on female participation in public affairs, hence 
confining them – with greater or lesser degrees of rigour – to the domestic domain, 
opportunities for female agency appear, at least on the face of things, to be highly restricted. 
Moreover when marriages are arranged by the elders, such that young women have little or 
no say in the choosing of their spouse, it is all too easy to conclude that women who find 
themselves will by definition be almost completely powerless, and regularly reduced to 
positions in which they become little more than pawns in male power-plays.  
 
But whilst the positions of formal subordination to which Punjabi women are conventionally 
allocated cannot be gainsaid, to assume on this basis that the terms and conditions of every 
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aspect of their existence is wholly determined by male hegemony, whose demands they are 
wholly incapable of resisting, is most misleading. On the contrary close ethnographic 
inspection of the quotidian processes of everyday life soon reveals that Punjabi women – just 
like members of all other excluded and subordinated groups – have in fact developed an 
immense capacity for agency, even if they frequently have no alternative but to deploy what 
Scott (1985) has graphically described as ‘the weapons of the weak’ to achieve their goals. 
To cite some brief examples, even if women find themselves circumscribed by male power, it 
also follows that the more strictly the rules of gender-segregation are enforced by 
conventions of purdah, the more autonomous of male power the occupants of the zenana tend 
to become. Hence within the limits of their own domain the women gain an ever more 
enhanced capacity to pursue their own ends on their own terms. However, close inspection 
reveals that this capacity is distinctly double edged. Whilst it does indeed provide extensive 
scope for the development of what can best be described as solidarities of sister-hood, and 
most especially for the construction of space within which to mock, circumvent and generally 
belittle the nominal moral, physical and sexual powers of men, it also provides the occupants 
of that space with an opportunity to construct internal hierarchies of their own. The almost 
unlimited power which a mother-in-law is often able to exercise over a newly married 
daughter-in-law is the classic example of such a relationship.  
In domestic arenas as in so many other contexts, a knowledge of the rules of the game is only 
a starting point for understanding what is going on, since actually playing the game is all a 
matter of strategy and tactics. Hence whilst everyone acknowledges the importance of the 
rules, success depends on the skill with which those involved manage to outmanoeuvre their 
rivals and opponents – most satisfyingly by playing all sorts of dirty tricks whilst staying very 
carefully within the letter of the law. Hence the moment one distinguishes between the rules 
of the game and the ways in which the game is actually played, a whole new world opens up. 
An obvious example is the rules of izzat. Whilst these insist that women loose all honour – 
and hence bargaining power – if public appearances suggest that their personal behaviour is 
anything other than comprehensively modest, it would be a great mistake to assume that 
private realities are necessarily congruent with public appearances. Precisely because they 
have shown their husbands such respect in public, Punjabi women are in an even better 
position to berate them for their inadequacies in private. Husbands can, of course, respond 
with violence, but those that do lose face, not least in the eyes of the other women in the 
household. Moreover in my experience very few Punjabi women are prepared to tolerate 
being treated as doormats, and as a result have devised all manner of strategies of self-
defence with which to counter male pomposity and stupidity. As is to be expected in the case 
of weapons of the weak, their strategies tend to be much more symbolic than physical. Using 
the vigour and symbolic resourcefulness of the Punjabi language, women are passed masters 
in the construction of thanē (insulting taunts carefully wrapped up in double entendre) which 
they regularly throw anyone who has the temerity to try to put them down. Of individuals 
vary in their capacity to deploy such tactics; what is clear however, is that those who can 
thereby claim the moral high ground often find they have an effective counter to those who 
seek to rely on the crudeness of brute force to get their way.  
 
However it is not just on the extent and significance of female agency on which I want to 
focus in this article: rather I want to press the argument on still further to explore the way in 
which similarly structured (and equally strongly gendered) sub-texts also underpin the 
complex patterns of affinal reciprocity between extended families to which Punjabi marriages 
give rise. In doing so I also want to explore the extent to which these countervailing sub-texts 
to the widespread public perception that South Asian kinship systems are grounded in a 
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condition of untrammelled male hegemony have been reinforced (and in some cases 
disastrously undermined) when marriages of this kind are constituted on a transnational basis.  
The spatial consequences of marriage 
Marriage always has spatial consequences: every new conjugal partnership can usefully be 
regarded as a seed from which a freestanding domestic group will eventually emerge. 
Sometimes germination is immediate, especially in contexts where Euro-American 
conventions of nuclear-family (or to be more precise, nuclear-household) construction are the 
norm. In such cases both spouses promptly move out of their parents’ households – if they 
have not done so already – to set up a new and free-standing household of their own. 
However in South Asia, as in many other non-European traditions, a very different set of 
conventions hold. Where multi-generational extended families are the residential norm, a 
very different pattern holds: the germination of a new domestic group is invariably delayed, 
and the only spatial development is a transfer of one of the spouses out of one pre-existing 
domestic group into another of a like kind. Hence when patri-virilocal residence is the order 
of the day, as it normally is in South Asia, the bride’s formal transfer from her natal residence 
to that of her in-laws a central component marriage rituals. Even if the distance which the 
bride traverses is no more than a few miles, and sometimes no more than a few yards, each 
such transfer establishes a relationship of affinal kinship, ristedari, between the two families. 
It follows that all relationships are in principle trans-local in character, in the sense that they 
establish a web of reciprocities between two spatially separated extended families. 
 
By contrast agnatic relationships (or in other words the ties of reciprocity which bind those 
linked by relationships of patrilineal descent), not only enjoy a position of nominal 
dominance over their affinal counterparts, but in principle at least, have no intrinsic spatial 
dimension. The cooperative co-residence of all its members of all its members under the 
same roof has always been a symbolically significant component of the Indian joint family 
ideal. But even though the principle of co-residence is much celebrated, closer inspection 
soon reveals that so long as family members continue to act as if they were still members of a 
single cooperative household even though they live apart on day to day basis, the underlying 
unity of the group is not regarded as having been seriously compromised. Hence close 
inspection of everyday activity within large joint families often reveals that what is publicly 
represented as a single household also contains a number of ‘informal’ spatial divisions 
within it: hence sisters-in-law, dragging their husbands behind them, invariably share 
domestic resources much less comprehensively than formal ideology suggest they should: 
indeed they can often be observed to be quietly at war with one another. Similarly if one such 
unit should hive off spatially – by going off to set up a business in a nearby town, for 
example, whilst the remainder of the family stays back in the village to cultivate the land – 
the corporate unity of the extended family is not regarded as having been significantly 
undermined. The key issue here is whether the commitment to unlimited mutuality amongst 
joint family members has been sustained; co-residence within a single household is merely a 
desirable, rather than a necessary, component of the ideal.  
In other words whilst affinal relationships have a necessary dimension of translocality in 
South Asian contexts, nominally entirely parochial relationships of agnatic descent can also 
readily be translocally extended without seriously threatening the integrity of the family’s 
underlying structures of kinship reciprocity.  
 
Nor is this deviation from the co-residential ideal in any way anomalous, even in South Asia. 
On the contrary such spatial extensions bring with them two valuable dimensions of strategic 
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advantage. On the one hand they can act as safety-valves if the tensions precipitated by 
power-plays between rival members of the extended family become so serious as to threaten 
the integrity of the group as a whole; meanwhile clear material advantages can also accrue 
when a spreading of the family’s spatial wings also permits them to take greater strategic 
advantages of a corporate division of labour. Some very clear principles underlie all this. That 
what holds the family together – regardless of such apparently anomalous spatial extensions – 
is not just their common moral commitment to the principle of cooperation, but also some 
hard headed material calculations which lead them to conclude that they are much better off 
holding together in all their differences than they would be if they fell apart.  
 
If these principles hold good in the relatively parochial confines of the Punjab, there is clearly 
every prospect that they will continue to do so when such networks go transnational. Insofar 
as transnational migrants by definition enter territory in which they have no prior foundations 
of security, building and sustaining structures of reciprocity around themselves. That is just 
what transnational networks are all about. Hence it should come as no surprise that is 
precisely the capacity of kinship relationships – both agnatic and affinal, and no less those 
articulated by women than by men – to generate and support resilient networks of trans-local 
reciprocity which has led to them playing such a salient role in ordering processes of long-
distance migration and settlement.  
The growth and character of transnational networks ‘from below’ 
It goes without saying that networks of this kind stand in sharp contrast to those launched by 
multi-national corporations operating very firmly above in several crucial senses. Not only 
are the reciprocities to which they give rise grounded in relationships of kinship, and hence 
informally rather than bureaucratically constituted, but to the extent that they stretch 
outwards from some of the most impoverished regions in the developing world and find 
fertile grounds for expansion in the highly developed economies of the metropolitan world 
they effectively transgress upon, rather than reinforce, established inequalities in wealth and 
power. To be sure these countervailing networks emanating from ‘from below’ have as yet 
attracted far less public attention than their hegemonic counterparts bearing down ‘from 
above’, but as the twenty first century develops there are good reasons for believing that the 
multitude of migration-driven transnational networks whose activities are currently 
expanding so rapidly are set to have as great an impact on the global socio-economic order as 
did Euro-American multinational in the late-colonial and immediately post-colonial periods. 
Although networks emanating from below are for the most constituted around kinship 
reciprocities rather than bureaucratic procedures, and much more transgressive than 
hegemonic in their impact, their members have displayed just as much ingenuity in devising 
strategies by means of which to circulate ideas, personnel and financial assets on a global 
scale, much to the collective advantage of all those involved.  
 
However these networks did not spring into existence out of the blue: most have much deeper 
historical roots than most Euro-American observers commonly appreciate. And although it is 
undoubtedly the case they owe their recent rapid growth to Euro-America’s chronic shortage 
of labour power (ironically enough both at the very top of the labour market, as in the case of 
software engineers, and at the very bottom in terms of cockle-pickers and so forth), two 
further factors have enabled these networks to become truly transnational. One the one hand 
migrants’ success in utilising the capacities for translocal extension embedded in their kinship 
networks works to construct and maintain complex relationships of inter-personal reciprocity 
even when those involved are very rarely in face-to-face contact with one another, and 
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secondly equally great success in using rapid improvements in communications technology to 
lessen the significance of those spatial disjunctions. Not only have Jumbo Jets massively 
reduced the cost of travel and rendered even the most distant of destinations immediately 
accessible, but satellite television, as well as international dialling and then the internet have 
had an even more dramatic impact on ease and speed with which information can be 
transmitted around global networks. Now that communications technology has ceased to be a 
monopoly of the elite and become readily accessible to all, those operating ‘from below’ have 
frequently tapped into the resultant opportunities thereby thrown up far more quickly and 
imaginatively than those still confined by sclerotic parameters of formal systems operating 
‘from above’ (Ballard 2004). No wonder there are an increasing number of spheres in which 
entrepreneurs embedded in global networks pressing upwards ‘from below’ have begun to 
carry all before them. 
 
Marriage, mobility and household reorganisation  
That said, my concern here is not so much with the success of these entrepreneurial networks, 
but rather with the character of their internal dynamics, and most particularly with the extent 
to which those dynamics are gendered. Hence the central issues on which I want to focus 
include: 
i) Given that virtually all these networks are grounded in reciprocities of kinship, in 
what senses are they gendered, and to what extent does this gendered dimension 
underpin the long-term viability of each such network? 
ii) If women play at least as significant role as men in processes network construction 
and maintenance, to what extent have women found that their power has been 
enhanced (or undermined) as a result of their participation in transnationally extended 
networks?  
As we have already seen, women play a far more active role in South Asian household and 
family life than is commonly appreciated. Hence whilst transnational networks are invariably 
assumed to be patriarchal in character, closer inspection soon reveals that women, together 
with the affinal ties to which their marriages give rise, play a far more active role than is 
commonly appreciated in developing, maintaining and extending ristedari, complex patterns 
of reciprocity whose smooth operation is the key to the strength and resilience – and hence to 
the success – of these informal transnational networks. To understand just how and why this 
is so we must turn our attention to the underlying ethnographic details. 
 
If we start from the perspective of basic building block in the migratory process - the 
extended family – the whole exercise is best understood as the outcome of a complex and 
ever-changing admixture of individual and collective considerations. Hence whilst the first 
pioneering step outwards from any such family is normally made individual male (for in a 
North Indian cultural context it is regarded being as inappropriate as it is immodest for a 
woman to act in such an autonomous way), he rarely does so without the active support of his 
entire extended family. Moreover if his travel expenses (which can often be considerable) are 
met from the group’s collective resources, it is taken for granted that he will share the 
benefits accruing from his overseas sojourn with the entire collectivity. But even if his move 
attracts collective approval, his departure also has immediate personal consequences: not only 
does it temporarily eliminate the prospect of active conjugal relations between husband and 
wife, but it also separates fathers from their children. There are only two way in which they 
necessary downsides of long-distance migration can be remedied: either by taking periodic 
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furloughs back home, or by taking the more radical step of spatially extending the family 
through the formation of a more fully-fledged domestic group overseas.  
 
As I have described in some detail elsewhere (Ballard 1994),  all the various communities of 
which Britain’s South Asian population is composed have by now long since implemented 
the second of these alternatives, although the speed with which each group have done so has 
varied enormously. Whilst such decisions to relocate are invariably multi-causal, almost all of 
these variations can be traced back in one way or another to differential patterns of 
interpersonal relationships with the extended family, which are in turn powerfully 
conditioned by the specific conventions of kinship and gender normatively deployed within 
each such group. Hence, for example, it was notable that in those groups in with a strong 
preference for close kin marriage (as in most Pakistani Muslim communities), family reunion 
took place considerably later than it did amongst Hindus and Sikhs, whose marriage rules are 
such that virtually all marriages take place amongst non-kin. One reason for this was that 
whilst the great majority of Muslim brides consequently felt themselves to be a more or less 
integral part of their in-laws’ family, since kinship reciprocities with their in-laws were 
usually in place before the marriage took place, Hindu and Sikh wives’ in-laws were 
invariably complete strangers. In the absence of prior ties, Hindu and Sikh wives had a much 
more immediate interest in putting some space between themselves and their in-laws by 
joining their husbands overseas than did their Muslim counterparts (Ballard 1991).  
 
However this was by no means the only factor that mattered. A further source of 
differentiation was the strictness with which the conventions of purdah – female seclusion – 
were interpreted as between Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims, let alone as between the many 
different communities into which members of these broad religious categories are divided. 
The greater the strictness with which the conventions were interpreted within any given 
community, the more nervous their members tended to be of the prospect that their 
commitment to female modesty might be undermined in a British context, and the more 
resistant they were to the prospect of women taking waged employment outside the home 
once they reached the UK. Hence not only did Hindu and Sikh women join their husbands in 
Britain much more swiftly than their Muslim counterparts, most sought waged employment 
as a matter of course: amongst other things this greatly enhanced their bargaining power vis-
à-vis their husbands. By contrast Muslim women not only joined their husbands considerably 
later, but very few of those who arrived directly from Punjab took waged employment 
outside their homes.  
 
Even so, it would be a mistake to assume that Muslims were helpless slaves of the 
conventions of purdah, or that they always waited for their husbands to make the necessary 
arrangements before setting out to the UK. Not a few arrived unexpectedly, and under their 
own steam – especially when rumours had reached them which suggested that their husband 
had become excessively attached to an English girl-friend. In those circumstances scruples 
about purdah were no obstacle: Muslim women were no less active than their Hindu and Sikh 
counterparts in taking active steps to correct their husbands’ errant ways.  
 
But no matter which partner instigated family reunion, and no matter how speedily or tardily 
the process took place, the arrival of wives and children had a far-reaching impact on the 
character of the ethnic colonies which sojourners turning settlers had begun to construct 
around themselves in the UK. Once more fully fledged households were in place there was 
much less need to take regular furloughs back home: indeed if everyone was to join in, the 
cost of travel became prohibitive; meanwhile the sharp rise numbers precipitated by family 
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reunion yet further boosted settlers’ commitment to reconstructing all the most salient social, 
cultural, religious and familial institutions within which they had operated back home. 
However the resultant ethnic colonies were by no means carbon copies of the original model. 
Although domestic lifestyles were indeed largely rooted in imported ideas, expectations and 
behavioural conventions, careful observation soon reveals that they were also the outcome of 
a careful process of adaptation to the settlers’ novel material surroundings. Likewise although 
each group of settlers consequently made eager efforts to construct a home from home for 
themselves in the new environment, it would be a great mistake to assume that outcome was 
merely a whole series of freestanding entities, such that the vigour of their members’ contacts 
with their distant home was destined, of necessity, to pass into free fall.  
 
To be sure some examples of such a cut-off process can be found: the same can be said of all 
the generalisations I have set out in this chapter. What is clear, however, is that the vast 
majority of South Asian settlers in the UK pursued precisely the opposite course. By making 
themselves at home in Britain on their own terms, and thereby constructing their own Desh 
Pardesh (Ballard 1994), settlers may have differentiated themselves spatially from their home 
base, but this in no way undermined the force networks of kinship reciprocity, both agnatic 
and affinal, in which they were all still bound. Not only was spatial separation readily 
overcome by making the maximum use of steady improvements in communications 
technology, but the increasingly globalised range of opportunities into which settlers were 
able to tap by virtue of the network membership meant that the material benefits, both actual 
and potential, of translocal collaboration remained substantial. Nowhere do the prospects of 
such benefits stand out more clearly than in terms of marriage.  
 
If transnational networks to be anything more than a short term phenomenon, they have to be 
extended across the generations. If settlers’ offspring cannot successfully be plugged into the 
network of transnational reciprocities in their own right, networks will become increasingly 
parochial, so much so that when all members of the older generation pass away, the 
transnational dimension of their network is likely to become extinct. Reciprocities must 
constantly be renewed if they are to avoid that fate. It is precisely in this context that the role 
of marriage becomes so vital. Besides binding a further generation into the network itself, 
network-endogamy provides its members with by far the most effective opportunity do 
develop and reinforce its spatial dimensions. If that was true back home in the Punjab, it is 
now becoming apparent that the proposition holds in spades in transnational contexts.  
The politics of rista 
Although the word rista can readily be mapped onto the English term ‘marriage’, it also has a 
much wider meaning, since it also refers to human relationships of all kinds. Hence in North 
Indian context the term for kinsfolk is ristedar – literally ‘those with whom relationships are 
held’. Given that it is also taken for granted that marriages will normally arranged, and that in 
doing so they will bring together spouses drawn from two separate but corporately structured 
extended families, in this context a rista does much more than to establish and legitimate the 
bride and groom’s conjugal union. Rather it marks the transfer of the bride out of her natal 
family and into that of her in-laws, and in doing so sets up a network of affinal relationships 
between two corporate extended families. The consequent extension of established patterns of 
ristedari provides all those involved with all sorts of opportunities to seek to utilise their 
participation in this new set of on-going reciprocities to their own advantage. And as we shall 
see, the benefits (which are by no means necessarily a one-way street) which can accrue from 
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the skilled manipulation of such affinal linkages are often very considerable, especially in 
transnational contexts. 
 
In examining the politics of riste in this sense, it is worth remembering that the actors who 
nominally stand at the centre of the whole exercise – the bride and groom – most usually play 
little or no part in these manoeuvres until their wedding is well behind them. The principal 
reason for this is that the choice of just who it is that any given rista will be conferred is most 
usually in the hands of the elders on each side, rather than their offspring. Moreover in 
making their decisions, the factors which most cotemporary western observers assume should 
be prioritised when it comes to the choice of a spouse – such as the extent to which the 
couple appear to be personally and psychologically compatibility – tend to come way down 
the list of the elders’ priorities. Besides the obvious need to conform to the rules of endogamy 
and exogamy which are extant within their community, two factors normally loom large in 
the elders’ agenda. Firstly the extent to which any given rista can be expected to enhance the 
material opportunities open to, and above all the status of, the entire extended family; and 
secondly the extent to which any given choice is likely to enhance the interests, and 
especially the personal bargaining power, of that particular elder.  
 
Of course elders’ priorities have begun to be modified as South Asian kinship networks have 
moved offshore, but once again careful inspection soon reveals that the extent to which they 
have changed their priorities have as yet been a great deal less drastic than most outsiders 
commonly assumed. Where more substantial changes have taken place, however, is in young 
peoples’ priorities, with the result that in overseas contexts the elder’s judgements and 
priorities have begun to be contested – and to be circumvented – ever more actively. 
However that the choice of rista might become a matter of contestation is nothing new at all: 
rather what has happened is that in transnational contexts the micro-politics of riste-
construction have gained several additional dimensions.  
 
That said, the shape and character of these manoeuvres are heavily influenced by the 
marriage rules to which such riste have to conform. As noted earlier, one of the central 
consequences of the rules of exogamy to which Sikhs and Hindus are expected to conform is 
that further marriages with existing ristedar are prohibited, with the result that each new rista 
has to be negotiated from scratch. This can be an extremely tricky business, especially when 
the family is simultaneously seeking to make a strategically advantageous match, to conceal 
all the potentially unattractive features of the bride or groom (and indeed any dirty washing 
which undermines the reputation of the whole family), and to avoid the shame of rejection if 
they show the hand to early but find themselves rebuffed. On the other hand the need to strike 
out into the blue each time round – as the rules of exogamy demand – not means that there 
are few if any intrinsic conflicts of interest been family members on the basis of their prior 
ristedari connections, but also that they are not surrounded by host of existing ristedar trying 
to use those connections to press forward their own interests in the marriage market.  
Strategies of ristedari when close kin marriage is permissible 
Everything works out very differently in those communities where close kin marriage is not 
only allowed but actively preferred. Before we begin to explore those differences, it is also 
worth emphasising that it is by no means that case that all marriages in such circumstances 
are necessarily contracted with close kin. On the contrary there all sorts of circumstances in 
which families decide to strike out into the blue in a similar fashion to the Sikhs and Hindus, 
particularly when this provides them with an opportunity to opportunity to cement a 
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cooperative relationship with a political or business associate by underpinning it with a fully 
fledged relationship of ristedari. Indeed it is also worth noting that the most robust way of 
achieving that end is through a process of batta-satta sister-exchange between the two 
families. In such circumstances each side holds the other in hostage: hence if one side of the 
relationship collapses, huge (and usually successful) efforts are likely to be made to collapse 
the other.  
 
However in most British Pakistani communities – and most especially those whose members 
ancestral roots lie in Districts Mirpur, Jhelum and Gujrat – marriages with non-kin are much 
more than exception rather than the rule. It is also worth noting that this is not so much the 
outcome of an outright requirement to marry close kin, but rather because those who set up 
these marriages have found it strategically advantageous to make such a choice. Why should 
that be so?  The most important reason appears to be sibling solidarity, or more precisely the 
widespread feeling that siblings should have a right of first refusal in the making of offers of 
rista with respect to each other’s children. Hence to refuse such an offer, not so much 
because one has accepted an alternative offer from some other sibling (which may indeed be 
disappointing, but is nevertheless regarded as entirely legitimate), but rather on the grounds 
that an offer has been accepted from someone entirely external to the biraderi (descent 
group) without good reason can easily lead to charges that anyone who so chooses has 
ignored a fundamental aspect of the obligations of siblingship. In other words it can be taken 
as an indication of a wish to step right outside the mutual reciprocities of siblingship.  
 
Further rationales are frequently advanced in order to legitimate such choices. Firstly that the 
Prophet married his favourite daughter Ayesha to his nephew, Hazrat Ali, thus providing the 
practice with Qur’anic justification; and secondly that such marriages provide a safeguard 
against property leaking out of the biraderi. Although the latter justification may seem to be 
very reasonable at first sight, it holds very little water in historical terms: although the rules 
of inheritance set out in the shari’a indicate that daughters should also take share in the 
patrimony, albeit on half the scale of those allocated to their brothers, inheritance practices in 
this area have always been de facto patrilineal. To be sure contemporary developments – 
which have led to rare (but well publicised) cases of daughters going to court to claim the 
share of the inheritance laid down in the shari’a – may currently give at least some substance 
to such property-based arguments; however they hold very little water vis-à-vis the past. 
Hence as far as I can see the exceptional strength of the preference for close-kin marriage in 
Northern Pakistan is best understood as a well established form of local custom and practice, 
whose roots are best explained as an outcome of the strategic and emotional impact of sibling 
solidarity.  
 
Be that as it may, such practices give rise to a rather different set of strategic manoeuvres 
when it comes to marriage, no less back home in Pakistan than in more transnational 
contexts. In the first place relatively few riste are constructed de novo; hence brides can 
normally expect to arrive in a household in which they already have connections of ristedari, 
such in most cases either their father- or their mother-in law (and sometimes both) is either an 
uncle or an aunt. It also follows that in these circumstances there is much less scrabbling 
around to find a ‘good’ rista: there is no great need to consider (or to elaborate) the 
credentials or status of either bride or groom if the new rista simply adds a further dimension 
to a well established network of reciprocities within the biraderi. And whilst considerations 
of how far the bride and groom have hitherto generally been no greater than in Hindu and 
Sikh contexts, the probability that the spouses will already be familiar with one another – and 
that they may even have to suggested to their parents that a rista between them would make 
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sense – is a great deal higher. Given the conventions of purdah, if marriages are to be 
arranged cousin-marriage has a great deal going for it, especially from the perspective of the 
spouses themselves.  
Marriage and the facilitation of migration  
As far as movements between Punjab and the UK have been concerned, chain migration has 
moved through at least three phases. The first phase was one which enabled young adult 
males could make their way to Britain to access industrial employment, which they could do 
virtually without hindrance until the mid-1960s. The second was set off when this initial 
wave of male migrants began to call their wives and children over to the UK to join them: 
this phase began in the early 1960s for Hindus and Sikhs, and rather later for Muslims, and 
was more or less complete by the mid 1980s. By then, however, ever more stringent 
immigration controls had been implemented, and it was widely expected that once this 
process of family reunion was complete, further immigration from South Asia would drop to 
a trickle. However those expectations were not fulfilled, largely because of the gradual 
emergence of a third phase of chain migration, which in this case was facilitated by marriage. 
By the time the twenty first century opened the first two phases were virtually extinct, and the 
third had emerged as by far the most effective vehicle through which to facilitate the 
maintenance of transnational networks in the longer term. 
 
A major causal factor behind this outcome has been the exigencies of English law. While 
Britain, like most other states, has found it relatively easy to erect border controls designed to 
exclude pioneer immigrants (i.e. those with no prior ties to the UK), and also to restrict 
attempts to exercise the right of family reunion solely to their dependent children who are 
still under the age of eighteen and parents over the age of 60 (always provided that they can 
demonstrate that there are no other relatives capable of supporting them in the subcontinent, 
the exclusion of spouses of UK citizens has proved very much more difficult task, most 
especially since the European Convention of Human Rights has gained the force of law. 
However that has certainly not stopped the authorities making extensive efforts to sidestep 
the problem, mostly by targeting the cultural specificities of South Asian forms of kinship 
and marriage. Hence a whole series of steps have been made to prevent the spouses of UK 
citizens of South Asian descent from entering Britain. They have included: 
• Claiming that the marriage is inadequately documented, such that must consequently 
be deemed invalid. 
• Insisting that one or more of the children of the marriage were not sired by the wife’s 
husband, so rendering the application invalid. 
• Claiming that the ‘primary purpose’ of the marriage was simply to gain entry into the 
UK, so rendering the application invalid. 
One by one all these objections have been knocked down, either by the Courts, or by DNA 
evidence, on straightforward grounds of impracticality, but even so vigorous efforts are still 
being made to ‘plug the gap’. In Britain steps are now being taken to render ‘forced 
marriages’ similarly invalid, whilst in Scandinavia all marriages between cousins are now 
being treated in much the same way. Although the question of whether – and for how long – 
these measures will withstand legal scrutiny still remains open, all these measures reflect a 
significant development: the extent to which marriage has become an ever more salient 
vehicle through which transnational migration can be implemented.  
 
But just why has this occurred? If we were to continue the argument in solely in terms of 
immigration control – as all too often occurs – the discussion would almost inevitably move 
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on to consider the ways in which unwanted and unwelcome immigrants have managed to 
identify all manner of ‘loop-holes’ through which to evade the democratically validated 
priorities of the vast majority of the indigenous population. Expressed thus, the self serving 
foundations of such a perspective should also immediately be apparent. Why should these 
spouses coming in from overseas – but not those who have married partners drawn from the 
indigenous majority – be regarded as ‘unwelcome and unwanted’; and whilst such measures 
may indeed be supported by most members of the indigenous majority, they are nevertheless 
patently both racially and ethnically exclusionary in intent. But even if many members of the 
indigenous majority find these developments disturbing, as they plainly do, just how do they 
look when viewed from the perspective of those actively involved in these processes? 
 
It would be idle to suggest that in South Asian contexts – no more and no less than in any 
other – material prospects play a significant role when it comes to choosing a spouse, and 
having married, on the decision to take up residence. Hence from a South Asian perspective 
the prospect of making a rista with a spouse from Britain, or indeed from anywhere else in 
the developed world is ipso facto an attractive proposition. However this is never the only 
factor which leads so many migrants to seek to arrange marriages for their offspring with a 
partner from back home: all they are doing is making the same kinds of choices, guided by 
much the same kinds of priorities as they would have done had they never migrated at all. 
That is precisely what happened once the second phase of migration was reasonably well 
under way. Time passed quickly, and it often seemed no more than the blink of an eye before 
the children of reunited families had left school, and hence the time had come to search out 
riste for them. Parents continued to make their choices with well-established criteria in mind, 
and from that perspective building further linkages with well-connected families back in 
Punjab made excellent sense.  
 
Meanwhile from a Punjabi perspective the prospect of arranging a riste for one of their 
offspring with a returnee from the UK was even more attractive. Not only did it offer those 
families who had missed out on the earlier phases of chain migration an immediate 
opportunity to plug into a transnational network, but also virtually guaranteed the physical 
transfer of a family member to the UK. Although post-marital residence had hitherto 
invariably been patri-virilocal, that convention disappeared almost overnight in the face of 
the opportunities offered by chain migration. Hence it was not just brides who left to join 
their husbands and in-laws, as had always been the case, but in such riste husbands invariably 
also set off overseas to join their wives, although in keeping with established conventions I 
such cases the couple invariably lived separately from their in-laws.  
 
However the marriage market in Punjab was by no means left untouched by these 
developments. So attractive was the prospect of jumping aboard the transnational bandwagon 
that overseas-based parents whose children had reached marriageable age found themselves 
quite literally besieged with offers of rista, and to those who had recently left Punjab in 
comparatively straightened circumstances (why else would have they have left) many of the 
offers placed before them were extremely attractive. Not only did families of much higher 
rank than those with which they could have previously have hoped to establish a connection 
put down tempting offers before them, but they often substantially sweetened those proposals 
with the addition of a substantial dowry. Such offers were hard to resist.  
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Problems associated with transnational riste 
But although the seeking riste for ones offspring from back home was consequently the order 
of the day during the early years of settlement in Britain, it was not long before the resulting 
marriages began to display an alarming tendency to go wrong. It was not so much that they 
all went wrong, but the fact that a significant number of such couples clearly found it difficult 
to reach a satisfactory modus vivendi, and that in some case this led to the outright collapse of 
the union, was enough to set alarm bells ringing, most especially amongst young people 
themselves. 
 
The most frequent causes of such difficulties were not hard to determine. By the time parents 
set about arranging their sons’ marriages, British-based grooms had often established a more 
or less illicit relationship with a local girl; if the girl in question was English parents would 
normally reject the prospect of marriage out of hand, and even if she was a Punjabi woman of 
the right caste, parents might still object to the prospect of a rista out of pig-headedness, 
feeling that their authority had been impugned and that in any event a better deal could be 
arranged back in Punjab. Sometimes riste back in Punjab did indeed shake errant sons ‘back 
onto the rails’ as their parents hoped; but when the brides with whom such brooms were 
provided turned out to shy and unconfident, and hence unwilling to accompany their new 
partners in the more ‘English’ side of their lives, the marriage could all to easily begin to fall 
apart even when the husband’s prior attachments had in fact had very little emotional depth. 
Ironically enough such brides often found it far easier to establish a working relationship with 
their mothers-in-law than their husband, even if they frequently found themselves blamed for 
failing to bring their husband back under control.   
 
British-based brides faced an inverse set of problems. Not only were they disturbed to find 
that even those grooms who were self-confident and self-sufficient in a Punjabi context could 
so easily find themselves all at sea in a British context, but also the deep frustration 
experienced by all those who failed to acclimatise to their new environment with speed could 
all too easy lead to them growing increasingly jealous of, and hence violent towards, their 
wives. Such tensions were far from easy to resolve. On the one hand the British-raised bride 
was indeed much more socially competent, and hence employable, within the context of the 
surrounding English world stood conventional Punjabi gender-role expectations on their 
head; and on the other stepping out of such a union had much more serious consequences, 
most especially in terms of future marriage prospects, for a woman than a man.  
The impact of marriage rules  
Given that it was Sikh and Hindu settlers, rather than their Muslim counterparts, who first 
began to reunite their families in the UK, it was British-raised Sikh and Hindu spouses who 
first began to encounter these problems. As they became more frequent younger sibling 
began to grow increasingly alarmed by many of their older siblings’ marital difficulties, and 
hence began put pressure on their parents suggesting that it would make much better sense if 
the they looked for a suitable rista in the emerging British marriage market rather than doing 
so back home in the Punjab. Since every rista had to be negotiated from scratch, why not 
start the initial search in the UK, they asked, rather than turning immediately to Punjab? To 
be sure it might be necessary to turn to Punjab as a last resort, but there were plenty of 
opportunities to construct attractive riste in the UK. 
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Although many parents remained sceptical about abandoning their long held expectations, 
and some obstinately dug in their heels, their offspring were in an excellent position to argue 
that their proposals were no more than common sense. To be sure offers of rista might flood 
in from Punjab, but no-one was under any obligation to accept them. Hence whilst parents 
might still play close attention to issues which most of their offspring by now regarded as 
wholly extraneous – such as how many acres of farmland the other family owned back in 
Punjab – it was nevertheless fairly easy to press parents to pay greater attention to such issues 
as the level of educational and professional success which the potential spouse had actually 
achieved. In response to these pressures the frequency of marriages with Indian-resident 
spouses soon began to decline rapidly. Amongst British-based Sikh and Hindu settlers 
choosing spouses for their offspring from within the diaspora very quickly became the 
preferential norm, so much so that India became the option of last resort.   
 
However comparative analysis suggests that the need to arrange each riste from scratch, and 
the lack of any necessary obligation to accept offers from others played a key role in this 
transformation. Although the general patterns of family organisation and kinship roles found 
within most South Asian Muslim communities are virtually identical to those deployed by 
Hindus and Sikhs, there is as we have seen one crucial difference which is particularly salient 
in those Punjabi Muslim communities whose members have established themselves in the 
UK: the preference for close-kin marriage, which is in turn rooted in a sense of sibling 
solidarity which give brothers and sisters rights of first refusal over the riste of each others’ 
children. Hence when British-raised Muslims began to articulate similar feelings of alarm 
about the prospect of being fixed up with a rista in Punjab – as they very soon did – they 
found themselves operating on much more difficult territory than their Sikh and Hindu 
counterparts. In this case their parents did have obligations to their kin back home, and their 
expected commitment to that form of reciprocity was so strong that to reject all such offers 
was tantamount to denying their loyalty to the sacred principle of sibling solidarity. Hence 
very few Muslim families followed the Sikhs and Hindus swift change in marriage strategies.  
The strategic use of ristedari in transnational arenas  
Even so sibling solidarity was not the only issue at stake here. Since close-kin marriage has 
such a far-reaching impact on patterns of inter-personal relations within extended families, 
the personal experience of transnational marriage, as well the micro-politics of the whole 
arrangement differs strikingly from those outlined for Hindus and Sikhs. Hence whilst the 
stresses and strains arising from differing degrees of cultural competence as between the two 
spouses tended to be no less significant amongst the Muslims, they were also cushioned by a 
countervailing factor: in the case of cousin-marriage the incoming spouse was in no sense a 
stranger, but instead had all sorts of prior connections of ristedari with other members of the 
extended family. Moreover the two spouses will at the very least have known of each others’ 
existence prior to the marriage taking place, and may well also have met face to face in the 
course of a family visit back home.  
 
Meanwhile what also became apparent in the course of fieldwork is that those responsible for 
setting up such marriages were often in competition with one another as to which of all the 
available cousins should be drawn into the rista. Marriage choices vis-à-vis their nephews 
and nieces are far from power-neutral as far as the oldest generation is concerned, and most 
especially so in transnational context. Hence not only does whoever has been favoured with a 
riste which provided them with entry into the UK have a debt of honour to his or her sponsor 
(in this case either an uncle and aunt turned father- or mother-in law), but ensuring that 
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majority of available riste draw in one’s own nephews and nieces, rather than one’s partner’s, 
enhances the bargaining power of either the husband or his wife. Indeed there is frequently a 
great deal of tension as between wives and their husbands when it comes to selecting riste for 
their offspring, and in my experience wives not infrequently manage to outmanoeuvre their 
husbands in the course of such battles. Moreover if the husband does indeed eventually win 
out, the consequences for an incoming spouse, and most especially for an incoming daughter-
in-law can be disastrous. She may indeed be her father-in-law’s niece, but if the her mother-
in-law is still seeking to champion one of her own nieces’ overlooked cause, the newly arrive 
bride may well find that her mother-in-law is busy doing everything she can to make her life 
hell, and to poison any affection which her husband has developed towards her.  
 
Yet despite the complexity to which all these currents and counter-currents give rise, the 
broad direction of flow in these circumstances is plain to see: given the high level of mutual  
commitment between siblings in the UK and their counterparts in Punjab, given the ease with 
which fulfilling these commitments can be used to transfer additional personnel (of both 
sexes) into the UK, and the pressure which those still in Punjab routinely place on their 
siblings in the UK to use their riste-bestowing capacities in such a way  as to facilitate such 
transfers, the scale of the inward flow of spouses from Pakistan to the UK has remained 
dramatically higher than that from India. Indeed close to half of all the rising generation of 
British Pakistanis still marry spouses recruited from Pakistan.  
 
Whilst it may well be that the frequency of such unions will decline before too long, it is 
nevertheless quite clear that for the best part of two decades marriage has been a major 
facilitator of a further inflow of personnel from Pakistan to the UK. However in seeking to 
comprehend this outcome it is worth remembering that whilst this has in part an outcome of a 
materially driven ‘pressure to migrate’ generated by sharp differences in living standards as 
between Pakistan and the UK, the extent to which those pressures have led to actual physical 
movements has not only been significantly conditioned by the cultural assumptions and 
priorities routinely deployed by migrants and their kinsfolk, but also that those assumptions 
and priorities are themselves been re-worked as a result of the very experience of migration 
itself. If transnational network building is an entrepreneurial activity we should not only 
expect that its parameters will vary as between communities, but also the parameters of any 
given process of network-construction can also be expected to develop and vary over time. 
 
Hence whilst it may well be that positive role of marriage which has played in facilitating 
transnational entrepreneurship may have increased the frequency of cousin-marriage (Shaw 
2001), it would be quite wrong to assume that the use of marital and affinal ties to achieve 
this end has necessarily been restricted to the Pakistanis. To be sure the initially-high 
frequency with which Sikh and Hindu settlers sought spouses for their offspring from Punjab 
dropped off rapidly in the face of critical resistance from their offspring themselves, but this 
certainly has not meant that the potentialities of marriage as a vehicle for transnational 
network construction have been entirely abandoned. Rather it has continued apace – albeit in 
different directions. Hence whilst Pakistani migrants and their offspring have used the affinal 
linkage to facilitate a substantial transfer of additional personnel from Pakistan to the UK, 
British-based Hindu and Sikh families have increasingly begun to use similar strategies to 
facilitate the transfer of personnel from the UK to North America. To understand how and 
why such a radical difference in outcome has been precipitated we must once again return to 
a detailed ethnographic consideration of just how riste are constructed in those contexts 
where marriage with close kin is precluded.  
 
 16
Whilst arranging riste in contexts where close kin marriage is the norm tends to precipitate 
conflicts between husbands and their wives over the specific direction in which existing 
kinship links should be reinforced, Hindus and Sikhs – for whom such options were barred – 
found themselves facing a far more serious challenge. Since each new rista had to be 
established ab initio, they had to track down a suitable partner for each of their offspring 
amongst families with whom they had no prior relationship. This was not only a difficult task 
in its own right, but also one which could put their own reputation on the line. If a family was 
known to have opened negotiations for rista, and if those negotiations subsequently turned 
out to have collapsed, there was a very real prospect that this would set off scandalous gossip 
which suggested that the potential ristedar had uncovered a dark family secret, so causing 
them to pull out. In the face of such gossip, which most usually suggested that the girl was in 
some way at fault, each successive attempt to arrange her marriage tends to become 
progressively more difficult.  
 
It is for this reason that the bachaula (an intermediary who introduces the two parties to each 
other, and in doing so takes on the responsibility of seeking to smooth out any difficulties 
which might arise between them) plays a central role in most Sikh and Hindu weddings – no 
less in the UK than back home in the Punjab. However the very existence of these mediating 
processes also provides a means whereby an appearance of total respectability can be 
sustained in public even though it has been comprehensively subverted in private reality. The 
current priority of many British-raised Sikhs and Hindus is not so much to persuade their 
parents to look automatically back to South Asia in search of riste – that argument has long 
been won – but rather to persuade their parents to accept a riste which they themselves have 
arranged: in other words a ‘love’ as opposed to an ‘arranged’ marriage. In doing so young 
people know the rules as much as do the bachaula: if they suggest a match which contravenes 
the strict rule of caste endogamy (and very often those of gotra exogamy as well) within 
which their parents routinely operate, they are likely to encounter intense opposition. But if 
they can find a partner who meets those requirements, and if they can also find a tame 
bachaula to act as an intermediary, most parents can readily be persuaded to agree to proceed 
‘as if’ the match was conventionally arranged, such that the whole gamut of customs and 
practices which have long accompanied marriage can be smoothly wheeled out. 
‘Modern’ arrangements and the resultant shift offshore 
But as the rising generation have played an ever more active role in ‘arranging’ their own 
marriages, they, too have run into the same problems of finding an appropriate match. Some 
follow well such established practices as making eye contact with potential partners at major 
public events such as weddings, exchanging mobile numbers, and taking it from there; others 
attend ‘raves’ and ‘singles parties’ from which all but Asian are barred; meanwhile an ever-
increasing number at are taking advantage of the potentiality of the internet. Not only do most 
communities, castes and sects maintain their own websites, so providing members with a 
ready means of getting in touch with one another, but numerous electronic marriage agencies 
have also sprung up to extend the role of the bachaula. Just like their more ‘traditional’ 
predecessors, such agencies invariably take careful account of their clients’ concerns with 
such matters of caste and gotra affiliation, as well as flagging their clients’ educational 
achievements, professional status and personal interests.  
 
Moreover precisely because the net is global, it is particularly well suited to provide a search 
engine for members of transnationally extended networks, since those seeking partners are as 
likely to based in British Columbia or Berkeley as in Birmingham, Baroda or Bombay. 
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Nevertheless most members of the rising generation of young British-born Sikhs and Hindus 
share a clear hierarchy of geographical preferences when it comes to assessing the 
attractiveness of potential riste. The United States and Canada normally head the list, with 
Britain not too far behind; however potential riste based in India are almost always regarded 
as an option of last resort.  
 
Such preferences reflect their experience of transnational social universe. To date those who 
have been born and brought up in one or other of the South Asian diasporas many ethnic 
colonies, no matter whether these were located in Europe, North America, Australia or the far 
East, regularly find that they have much more in common with each other than they do with 
those of their peers from the subcontinent – and most especially with those who were born 
and brought up in the rural areas from which their parents and grandparents emigrated many 
decades ago. However the character of the disjunction between such pardeshis and their deshi 
counterparts needs to be carefully specified. It is not so much that the pardeshis are wholly 
unfamiliar with ‘traditional’ modes of behaviour practiced in their villages of origin: after all 
their own parents for the most part continue to organise their lives in terms of a close variant 
of those conventions. Rather the most salient aspect of the difference home-based deshis and 
their pardeshi counterparts is that the former have much more limited skills in cross-cultural 
navigation, with the result that they display a marked tendency to become flustered, confused 
and unnerved when introduced to the more ‘Westernised’ socio-cultural arenas in which the 
pardeshis regularly participate, and whose conventions they have also begun to import into 
their increasingly hybridised domestic and personal lives. Hence when it comes to choosing a 
spouse, those who have been born and brought up in the diaspora strongly prefer to track 
down prospective spouses who have had a similar pardeshi experience to their own.1  
 
However such considerations are by no means the end of the story. As the younger generation 
of Hindus and Sikhs have become steadily more educationally and professionally successful, 
so they have begun to appreciate the benefits associated with membership of a transnational 
network, not least because a careful choice of riste can enable them to leapfrog many of the 
obstacles which might otherwise hinder their capacity to make the most of their qualifications 
in the global labour market. Hence the fact that North America so often stands at the top of 
the preferential list of rista locations is no means solely driven by an awareness that 
professionals enjoy a substantially greater standard of living on the far side of the Atlantic 
than they can expect in the UK. Just as importantly, this is further reinforced by an awareness 
that in the United States and Canada the degree of racial and ethnic exclusionism experienced 
by professionals of South Asian descent is – or at least was until the events of 9/11 – 
considerably than that which they encounter in Britain. In such circumstances it makes 
excellent sense for those with internationally recognised qualifications to seek out riste on the 
far side, not least as a means of advancing their professional careers. 
 
Needless to say, it is quite possible for young British passport-holders with qualifications in 
Medicine, Accountancy, Software Engineering and so forth to secure jobs on the far side of 
the Atlantic without tapping into the resources of a transnational network, let alone resorting 
to marriage to facilitate their objectives. Nevertheless if such resources are indeed available, 
the whole process of job- and house-hunting is rendered far less problematic than it might 
                                                 
11 The implicit yardstick here is of the deshi of rural origins, pindaan in Punjabi. However many returnee 
pardeshis find their assumptions wholly up-ended when they encounter young people drawn from the privileged 
elites in cities such as Delhi, Bombay and Islamabad; to their amazement, they discover that such ‘deshis’ are 
often more ‘westernised’ than they are themselves.  
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otherwise be. Just as in earlier manifestations of chain migration, the opportunity to tap into 
ready-made networks of mutual support from the moment of one’s arrival greatly facilitates 
the whole process of transnational entrepreneurship. 
 
Once these processes have become well-established in any given community, there are good 
reasons for suggesting that the networks of reciprocity in which they are grounded have gone 
‘offshore’, in the sense that they can and do continue to operate smoothly even as connections 
with their home base in South Asia fall ever more firmly into abeyance. Moreover so long as 
those involved continue to display a strong proclivity for network-endogamy, there is no 
reason why these ‘offshore’ operations should not maintain themselves in this fashion for 
several generations to come. But in seeking to appreciate the dynamics of these developments 
it should always be remembered that the reciprocities which underpin these networks are not 
the outcome of authoritarian directives laid down by the elders, and still less of mindless 
obedience to the forces of ‘tradition’: rather their long-term continuity is above all grounded 
in the strategic choices – not least with respect to marriage – made by members of each 
successive generation.  
 
Whilst there is a clear tendency for such networks to move ‘offshore’, most especially when 
the rising generation of young people begin to achieve ever greater degrees of educational 
and professional success, none have as yet wholly lost contact with their home bases in South 
Asia.2 Almost all still retain a strong emotional commitment to their roots, which often 
manifests itself through support for charitable activities in South Asia. Initiatives supported 
by the Aga Khan’s Ismaeli followers provide the most dramatic example of such 
developments, although many other as yet less dramatic examples of the same tendency in 
other communities can also be cited. Moreover even in the most determinedly offshore 
networks, marriages with spouses based in South Asia, through infrequent, have by no means 
come to a halt. There are at least two reasons for this.  
On the one hand South Asia itself is developing very rapidly, such that the size of its 
professional population is expanding apace: as a result riste between members of the diaspora 
and well-educated spouses from prosperous families based in cities such as Delhi, Mumbai 
and Bangalore are gradually becoming more numerous. Meanwhile at the other end of the 
marriage market arranging a rista back home is still the option of last resort, especially for 
difficult-to-place daughters. Many potential grooms, and especially their parents, are deeply 
uneasy about accepting a bride who has been ‘spoiled’ by having had a previous marriage, 
most especially if she has retained custody of any children; however in rural Punjab it is 
comparatively easy to find families who are prepared to overlook any such downside, 
especially since the resulting rista can be expected to give the groom instant access to the 
economic benefits associated with residence in the UK.  
Marriage and employment 
Employment – or more precisely the prospects of gaining access to an income substantially 
larger than that which one previously enjoyed – is a central driving force behind the 
                                                 
2  It is well worth noting that Europe’s Romany population appear to be an exception to this pattern, even if their 
roots in the subcontinent are far more ancient than those of the communities with which I am concerned here. 
Whilst there are strong indications that the Romany tradition also has its roots in North India, direct contact 
ceased many centuries ago. Nevertheless endogamy, together with a commitment to strictly enforced rules of 
purity and pollution have provided more or less nomadic Romanies with a highly effective means of sustaining a 
clear disjunction between themselves and members of the house-dwelling population alongside whom they have 
lived in close symbiosis for many centuries. (Okely: 198*) 
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maintenance of transnational networks. Nevertheless in this sphere just as in all the others we 
have considered, the way in which those prospects are utilised is heavily conditioned by the 
cultural conventions and priorities deployed within each specific network. Given that Sikhs 
and Hindus have no reservations about the prospects female employment, the employability 
of both partners invariably looms large in riste negotiations, particularly in diasporic 
contexts. Hence the academic and professional achievement of the spouse on offer is a central 
issue when it comes to evaluating the merits of any potential riste: in doing so the ideal match 
is one where the groom is marginally better qualified than the bride. What this also means is 
that anyone who slips down a well-understood hierarchy of achievement – as a result, for 
example, of having obtained their degree in an institution which has only recently put its 
former status as Polytechnic status, rather than one or other of the much longer established 
Universities belonging to the ‘Russell group’ – will be placed well down the pecking order. 
However Asian parents are nothing if not pragmatic: such deficiencies can easily be remedied 
by those who have gained an appointment with a major firm of Lawyers or Accountants. 
Hence Sikh and Hindu parents’ well-known concern with the educational success of their 
offspring has strongly instrumental roots: in the absence of qualifications, how on earth are 
they going to be able to fix them up with decent riste? Moreover a similar equation operates 
as far as young people themselves are concerned. The better greater their qualifications, the 
greater the role they are likely to be able to play in choosing their own partner.  
However these considerations currently play out in a very different way in many Muslim 
communities, most especially in those communities in which close kin marriage is the order 
of the day. As we have seen whilst a high frequency of close kin marriage generates 
exceptionally close knit networks of ristedari, the attenuation of the built in built-in 
dimension of trans-locality precipitated by a commitment to exogamy has in no way 
undermined their capacity to develop translocal networks, or to circulate personnel and assets 
around on a transnational scale. Nevertheless the British example suggests that resultant 
networks are not only much more in-turned than those created by communities in which 
marriage rules explicitly exogamous, but that that those involved also tend to sustain 
particularly strong dyadic ties with their home base in South Asia. As a result they have as 
yet displayed very much less of a tendency to drift ‘offshore’. This has also had yet further 
consequences for Muslim settlers’ relationship to the employment market, as well as the 
weight put on educational and professional achievements in the process of arranging riste 
have both been further conditioned by the exigencies of successive changes in UK 
immigration rules.  
 
In sharp contrast to their Hindu and Sikh settlers, whose wives normally began to make a 
significant contribution to the income of the household by taking up paid employment soon 
after their arrival in Britain, in most Muslim communities it was considered both shameful 
and dishonourable for women to take up paid employment outside the immediate household. 
Hence in addition to the considerations of kinship discussed earlier, this was a further factor 
militating against swift family reunion, for whilst the arrival of women and children 
necessarily brought about a sharp increase in household expenditure, in the Muslim case this 
was not normally accompanied by a parallel increase in household income. However the 
exigencies of immigration control fairly soon overcame these reservations: as the rules were 
tightened still further, families were reunited willy-nilly: no-one wanted to see their kinsfolk 
left trapped behind a closing door. Hence by the mid-1980s, the vast majority of Pakistani 
settlers had completed process of family reunion in the UK. 
 
But if policy makers hoped that this would reduce further immigration from Pakistan to a 
trickle, they were to be disappointed. Many of the new arrivals had only just scraped under 
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the ‘not aged more than sixteen years’ rule for dependent children, and in much the same way 
as their Hindu and Sikh predecessors they looked back to their villages of origin when they 
began to look for spouses for their offspring – which they soon began to do on a large scale.  
Not surprisingly many such riste ran into just the same problems as those experienced by 
their Hindu and Sikh counterparts, especially when there was a large gulf in cultural 
competence as between a British-raised spouse and a partner whose previous life-experience 
had been limited to rural Pakistan. But although the problems were just the same, Muslim 
parents found it far more difficult to make a positive response to pleas that they should look 
for suitable riste for their offspring in the UK. Given Muslim marriage rules, parents were not 
starting their searches for riste from scratch; rather they were honour bound to give their 
immediate kinsfolk – and especially those who still found themselves stuck back in Pakistan 
– rights of refusal over the riste of their offspring. Moreover whilst it was well understood 
that not every such offer could possibly be accepted,  not least because a range of parallel 
proposals on behalf of a various different cousins would normally be put forward, it was 
regarded as quite unacceptable for a couple who had established a foothold in Britain to try  
to pull up a drawbridge behind them. A refusal of all such offers was regarded as tantamount 
to a denial of the reciprocities which lie at the heart of ristedari. Hence if settlers wished to 
remain members of the network, and hence keep their transnational linkages alive, they had 
no alternative but to respond positively to offers of riste from their kinsfolk. Such 
considerations applied no matter how unhappy their sons – and even more so their daughters 
– may have been about the prospects of making such a match. The consequences of all this 
have been reaching: above all the switch of from arranging riste in the subcontinent in favour 
of those contracted elsewhere in the diaspora has developed very much more slowly in most 
groups of Muslim settlers than it has amongst their Sikh and Hindu counterparts: indeed in 
most biraderis of rural origin, over 50% of marriages are still being contracted within 
spouses drawn from South Asia. Such matches are undoubtedly likely to decline in frequency 
at some time in the future, but at present the rate of decline cannot be described as swift. 
 
How is this best understood? Looked at from the perspective of individual rights, such 
choices – especially since they were and are made on behalf of others – may seem 
oppressively conservative, perhaps even as ‘forced’. However when viewed from the 
perspective of the corporate moral perspective which underpins the structure of the joint 
family, such choices can be seen as much more justifiable than such a narrowly Eurocentric 
perspective might suggest. If a collectivity such as a joint family is to sustain itself, it follows 
that all its members will indeed sometimes be required to sacrifice a degree of personal 
sovereignty in order to satisfy the needs and requirements of the group as a whole. Viewed 
from that perspective, making personal sacrifices is not the issue: that is precisely what 
family life is all about. Rather the central point of contention is whether someone is being 
required to make an unreasonable sacrifice, bearing in mind those sacrifices which are being 
or have been made by other family members. In other words it is not the expectation of 
personal sacrifice which is oppressive, but rather the prospect that necessary burdens are not 
being equitably shared amongst family members, and/or that insufficient efforts have been 
made to redistribute or to renegotiate those burdens. These are issues to which we will have 
to return later.   
 
But before doing so it is also worth noting that the combined effect of the priority given to the 
maintenance of kinship reciprocities whilst also manoeuvring round the exigencies of 
immigration legislation has had all manner of further implications for the ways in which 
members of the rising British born generation have set about gaining educational 
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qualifications in the UK, together with the character of their participation in the labour 
market. 
 
When the majority of riste – whether arranged locally or transnationally – take place between 
close kin, the level of each of the spouse’s educational achievements, and even their earning 
potential tends to matter much very much less than is the case in those groups where marriage 
rules demand exogamy, such that each rista is negotiated from scratch. Hence whilst most 
Muslim parents are in principle keen to see their sons and rather more rarely their daughters 
reach a high level of educational achievement, in their case the absence of such achievements 
has relatively little impact on the task of arranging suitable riste for their offspring. If most 
matches are kinship-driven, whilst a high level of educational achievement is undoubtedly 
welcome, it is certainly not essential to making an acceptable match. Hence the intensity of 
parental insistence on educational success tends to be somewhat attenuated in Muslim 
families in comparison with the pressures which can be observed in most Hindu and Sikh 
families. 
 
However by contrast to all this, the pressures stemming from changes in the immigration 
rules have had quite the opposite effect, especially for Muslim girls. In an effort to reduce the 
inflow of spouses from the subcontinent, the Home Office introduced a rule that entry 
certificates would only be issued to those spouses who were able to show that their sponsors 
– i.e. their UK-based partners – not only had access to suitable accommodation, but were also 
in a position to support them without recourse to public finds: in other words their sponsors 
had to have a job. But if this measure was designed to dissuade Muslim parents from 
selecting groom from South Asia for their stay-at-home daughters, it promptly back-fired: 
most parents in that situation promptly began to encourage their daughters from seeking 
employment. Not that their daughters needed much encouragement to do so: as far as they 
were concerned not only did employment give them access to a great deal more autonomy 
than they would previously have enjoyed, but the wages they earned substantially increased 
their bargaining power within the family. Nor was that all. If daughters were permitted to go 
out to work, it was much more difficult for parents o object to their daughters continuing their 
education after the age of sixteen, especially since schools and colleges are routinely viewed 
as providing a less modesty-challenging environment than the much more open employment 
market. To be sure gaining advanced educational qualifications often made little difference to 
their bargaining position in the marriage market, and could even scare off some potential 
grooms, but this mattered little to the girls themselves: education not only enabled them to 
postpone their marriages, for most parents agreed that marriage should not take place until 
their education was complete, but also provided them with a steadily increasing level of 
bargaining power the higher up the system they managed to penetrate. Hence despite the 
many additional handicaps they face British Muslim girls have now begun to outperform 
their male siblings, no less in professional than in educational terms.  
The potential downsides of transnational marriage 
So processes of kinship-driven transnational networking have been presented in 
overwhelmingly positive terms. That is right and proper. As far as the vast majority of those 
who have participated in these processes are concerned, the benefits of having been able to 
participate in – and in doing so to contribute to the development of – these networks have far 
outweighed the costs. How else could so many millions of people been in a position to 
transport themselves moved from positions of severe structural disadvantage way out on the 
periphery of the global socio-economic order straight into its metropolitan heartlands, so 
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providing their offspring with a springboard from which to press their way even further 
forward through the metropolitan social order?  But whilst migration invariably brings 
substantial material benefits, they can only be accessed at considerable personal cost. Not 
only do those costs tend to become particularly salient when the elders find themselves driven 
to override the personal priorities of their offspring in order to press forward what they regard 
as the best interests of their extended families, and most especially the reinforcement of the 
patterns of transnational reciprocity in which they are bound up, and where their efforts to do 
so constantly precipitate ever more restrictive interpretations of the immigration rules. 
Although these matters really deserve to be addressed at length in a separate paper, I have 
nevertheless decided to close this article with a brief overview of the most salient issues in 
this sphere, if only because they remain the focus of (often seriously misinformed) public 
debate.  
The experience of Bilayati brides married to Desi husbands 
In historical terms, South Asian parents have long displayed a marked propensity to arrange 
their daughters’ marriages either before or at least soon after they passed puberty. Their 
principal reason for doing so was to guarantee their family’s honour. To the extent that their 
izzat, honour, was crucially dependent on the maintenance of a spotless reputation for 
sharam, modesty, by all its womenfolk, it made good sense to pass that responsibility on to a 
husband as soon as a daughter reached the point at which she has become potentially sexually 
active. This was further accompanied by an assumption if two young people of opposite 
sexes found themselves together in the absence of a suitable chaperone, sexual activity was 
almost certain to take place. But if that was indeed the case, many British-based Pakistani 
parents took the view that there was an obvious solution to their worries about their inability 
to chaperone their self-evidently nubile British-raised daughters: if one exposed them to the 
prospect of legitimate sexual activity at the age of sixteen there was not only an excellent 
prospect that they would become emotionally committed to their spouse, but also that 
pregnancy would tie them yet further into both marriage and motherhood – no matter how 
great a disjunction there might be between their daughters’ bilayati (overseas) experiences 
and expectations and those of their desi (home-based) husbands.  
 
But although my experience suggests such expectations have a considerable of substance, 
some further provisos must also hold. Some are self-evident: hence, for example, the strategy 
is much less likely to work if the bride is heavily committed (albeit surreptitiously) to a 
boyfriend back in the UK, and/or if the groom is neither youthful nor reasonably presentable.  
However further set of factors which can all too easily undermine the effectiveness of this 
strategy arises from the exigencies of the immigration rules. Only when the marriage 
ceremony has been completed can husbands submit an application for Entry Clearance into 
the UK; and whilst queues are now shorter than they once were, applicant in South Asia can 
expect to wait for at least three months before being called in for an interview. My experience 
suggests that such applications suggests are subjected to particularly close scrutiny, and that it 
can easily take as long as two years before the Entry Certificate Officer is satisfied that 
everything is in order, and a certificate is granted.   
 
However few if any newly married brides stay with their husbands for as long as this. Firstly 
they cannot afford to, for unless they can show that they are still employed in the UK, their 
husband will not be issued with an entry certificate. Secondly they may well fall pregnant: in 
those circumstances they invariably return to the UK, if only because of widespread 
scepticism about the quality of medical care available in rural Pakistan. But whatever the 
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grounds on which they may have returned to the UK, their new-found status as married 
women enables them to claim a significantly greater degree of autonomy than they did 
before. Just how those who find themselves precipitated into this interstitial position react to 
the opportunities thereby thrown up varies enormously. To be sure a substantial number take 
advantage of this period to enhance their educational qualifications, or by building up the 
financial resources needed to establish a new household; however a far from insignificant 
number pursue quite te opposite course, and begin to explore the world on their own terms, 
not infrequently in ways which their parents and their still-distant husbands would strongly 
disapprove. Two years is a long time in the life of a teenager, and most especially for one 
who has recently been initiated initiation into all the pleasures and excitement of sexuality, 
but whose husband’s arrival in the UK has to all intents and purposes been indefinitely 
postponed. Of course it is quite possible for such young women to put their adventures 
behind them when their husbands eventually arrive; but even if they do the newly arrived 
spouses frequently finds himself playing on an exceedingly sticky wicket, most especially if 
his wife formed a strong romantic attachment – as like as not with a locally born and raised 
young Pakistani – whilst her husband struggled to fulfil the requirements of his ECO.  
 
However this is by no means the only – or even the most significant – challenge with which 
desi husbands regularly find themselves confronted once they reach the UK. As they soon 
discover, newly arrived mangeter (‘those who have been asked for’) initially find themselves 
in an extremely uneasy position, even when they have the advantage of prior ties of ristedari 
with either their father- or their mother-in-law. Their central problems lie elsewhere. 
Although notionally masters of their own households, and hence in a position to claim 
comprehensive authority over their wives, in the absence of familiarity with the social, 
cultural and linguistic skills which enable their British-raised peers to navigate with ease 
through the hybrid Anglo-Asian world which they inhabit, most mangeter find it next to 
impossible to underpin their nominal status with real resources.3 Hence they routinely find 
themselves restricted to ill-paid jobs right at the bottom of the labour market, as for example 
instance in restaurants and take-aways where they are also required to work extremely anti-
social hours. But whilst their wages do at least give them some bargaining power, many 
mangeter nevertheless feel themselves humiliated by the superior earning-power of their 
wives.  
 
Mangeter also experience similar forms of perceived role reversal up in all manner of other 
contexts. By local standards their personal styles are regarded as profoundly un-cool, whilst 
their English is normally insufficiently fluent to enable them to negotiate the simplest of 
commercial transactions with any great confidence. Nor do they even have a secure right of 
residence in the UK. On entry spouses from South Asia are normally only granted a 
temporary right of abode in the UK, although this can be made permanent if the conjugal 
partnership is still in place twelve months later. Hence if the marriage should collapse during 
that period, there is a very real prospect that the mangeter will find himself summarily 
expelled from the UK.  
 
Given the strength of all these contradictions, it should come as no surprise that a significant 
proportion of matches of this kind do indeed run into difficulties – whether this be a rocky 
patch which the couple eventually manage to circumnavigate or a maelstrom which sinks 
their relationship in short order. Moreover when such outcomes precipitate an intense degree 
                                                 
33 An  excellent discussion of the difficulties which newly-arrived mangeter experience in the employment 
market can be found in (Kalra 2000) 
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of personal damage on one or other of the parties, they or their kinsfolk may very well seek to 
retaliate in revenge. Hence, for example, a bride may well seek to undermine her groom’s 
(and her parents’) interests by insisting to the authorities that her marriage was ‘forced’. If, 
however, her efforts do indeed meet with success, the hurt caused to her husband and his kin 
can be very substantial. If badly handled this can all too easily set off an escalating spiral 
mutual abuse between the two parties – which by now will almost certainly have expanded to 
include their respective extended families – which can have all sorts of consequences. If her 
parents side with her husband (for after all one or other of them arranged the marriage), the 
bride can all too easily find that the collapse of her marriage leads to a complete rupture of all 
the expected reciprocities between herself and her extended family. If one the other hand they 
support their daughter, their actions may well add yet further to an escalating spiral of 
hostility between two extended families which can lead, at the extreme, to homicidal 
violence.   
The experience of Bilayati husbands married to Desi brides 
As one might expect outcomes tend to follow a very different pattern the genders are 
reversed. In the case of British-born grooms, marriage is very much a postponeable event. 
Hence whilst parents certainly expect that their sons will eventually settle down, get married 
and produce heirs to extend the family into the future, is not until they have reached their 
mid-twenties that young men begin to find themselves under serious pressure to do so. 
However whilst young Sikh and Hindu men are expected to devote themselves to acquiring 
skills and qualifications during this period, not least because it will be far more difficult to 
arrange a worthwhile rista if they lack them, those belonging to Muslim families – or more 
precisely, those who belong to families in which marriage with cousins is the norm – 
normally find themselves under much less pressure to excel: their educational and 
professional achievements will have much less impact on their marriageability. Hence if 
young men from such families spend some time as lifunga, ‘lay-abouts’, they are often 
treated with considerable indulgence by their parents on ‘boys will be boys’ grounds.  
 
But if young men are consequently expected to spend some time sowing wild oats before 
settling down, most parents regard marriage as the sovereign remedy for this condition. This 
is particularly so when they find themselves confronted with one of the most alarming 
manifestations of such deviance: their son’s over-heavy involvement with an English-girl 
friend. Hence when parents conclude that their sons’ ‘peccadilloes’ have gone too far, young 
men frequently find themselves hauled off to Pakistan for a swiftly arranged marriage. 
Moreover the terms of trade laid down in such circumstances are normally quite clear: do our 
bidding, or normal kinship reciprocities will come to an end. 
 
To be sure only a minority of grooms taken back to the subcontinent to be fixed up with a 
rista are confronted with such a stark choice, but it is nevertheless worth considering the 
extreme case because it serves to illuminate the more general argument. In the first place it is 
quite wrong to assume that a marriage arranged on this basis is inevitably doomed to failure. 
Not only is the formal pattern of power relations in such a marriage congruent with 
conventional expectations, but if the young woman to whom he has been married is able to 
seduce her husband in emotional and psychological as well as physical terms, she may well 
be able to deploy ‘the weapons of the weak’ with quite spectacular success. Of course the 
likelihood of any given bride pulling this off is powerfully contingent on her own personal 
and psychological strengths, but it is also worth remembering that such strengths are in no 
sense alien to the zenana (the womens’ quarters in a household where gender segregation is 
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strongly marked). Hence if British-based grooms are foolish enough to assume that the 
seemingly shy and modest virgins to whom they have been married will of necessity 
comprehensively obey their instructions without demur, they are in for a big surprise. To be 
sure such brides will be extremely cautious at first as they work out the lie of the land. But if 
their mothers have done their job properly they will soon begin to take every opportunity to 
turn their chains into weapons, and render the silken bonds by which their husbands are 
bound to them just as effective as those of steel.  
 
Of course the skill with which wives manage to deploy these tactics varies greatly from 
individual to individual, as does the capacity of their husbands to resist their wiles. Moreover 
it may well be, as noted earlier, that a newly-married bride’s most immediate task is to reel in 
her mother-in-law, on the grounds that unless she has got her sas on-side, she will never be 
able to gain full command of her husband’s affections. By the same token it is also worth 
noting that time is on every bride’s side: if she can manage to stick out until she herself 
becomes a sas, she herself has every prospect of ruling the roost. It follows that in the light of 
such micro-political manoeuvres within the household – whose progress is invariably hidden 
from public view – that the private reality of gender relationships are far less hierarchically 
ordered than public appearances might suggest.  
 
Even so, it would be idle to suggest that they always are. No matter how carefully mothers 
may instruct their daughters as to the tactics they should deploy, some young women prove to 
be far more skilled at pulling them off than others. Sometimes brides find they can rely on the 
strong support of their natal families if their negotiations with their husbands and in-laws turn 
sour, others find themselves left hanging in the wind. Some find themselves married to 
sadistic thugs on whom the most sophisticated tactics will not work. Moreover in the long run 
men are always in a stronger bargaining position than husbands, for whilst divorced husbands 
stay with their families and can remarry with ease, divorced wives have to rely on the charity 
of their natal families, and re-marriage is normally a great deal more difficult to arrange. It is 
also worth remembering that none of these problems have anything specifically to do with 
migration, although it is undoubtedly the case that these tensions tend both to be more 
frequent and to be more difficult to contain when the marriage in question has been 
transnationally arranged. Moreover immigration law has a further twist in its tail for in-
coming brides whose marriages fail as opposed to those with rights of residence as a result of 
having been born and brought up in the UK. Whilst the latter can bid for public sympathy by 
claiming to be the victims of a forced marriage, the formed are likely to receive nothing more 
than a missive from the Home Office indicating that their temporary Right of Abode in the 
UK is not being extended, and requiring them to remove themselves from the country at the 
earliest opportunity.  
Conclusion  
Having presented a broad overview of the role played by marital and affinal ties in the 
construction and maintenance of transnational networks, several points should by now be 
quite clear. Firstly that affinal ties are at least as important as agnatic ties in such processes, 
not least because of the crucial role they play in maintaining such linkages over the 
generations. Hence if we view transnational migration not just as an entrepreneurial exercise, 
but also as one which regularly seeks to transgress established patterns of transnational 
inequality, it follows marriage can also be viewed as a significant ‘weapon of the weak’ 
which migrants have as it were tucked their sleeves, and which can be – and indeed is – 
regularly deployed as an when circumstances render that appropriate.  
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If, however, we regard current patterns of immigration control as the outcome of constant 
efforts by the authorities to keep out ‘unwanted’ immigrants (even when jobs are readily 
available at their destination) in the face of equally constant efforts by transnational 
entrepreneurs to find their way through chinks in those exclusionary barriers (a process 
commonly described as ‘exploiting loopholes’), then it is immediately obvious why kinship 
and marriage should have become such a public battleground. Not only is kinship the 
principle vehicle facilitating chain migration, but Britain has also signed up to the European 
Convention of Human Rights which guarantees, amongst other things, a right to family life. 
So just what are the ‘loopholes’ which transnational migrants are illegitimately exploiting? 
Nothing less, it would seem, than the rights set out in Article 8 of ECHR.  
 
How, then, can popular demands to bring the inflow of (non-European) migrants to a halt be 
fulfilled without contravening the principles of ECHR? Two ways of squaring the circle are 
logically possible. Firstly by adding a further proviso to Article 8, namely ‘…. not necessarily 
in the country of your own choice’; thus far, at least, the authorities in Britain have steered 
clear of that course. The second option is to suggest that the migrants’ understanding of 
‘family’ is erroneous by challenging either the existence or the legitimacy of the kinship 
relationships on which they relied in order to claim their rights under Article 8. Hence the 
British immigration authorities have successively relied on arguments that the applicants 
were not related as claimed, that they had failed to show that the ‘primary purpose’ of the 
marriage was anything other than gaining entry to the UK. To be sure both those objections 
have now been cast into abeyance on the grounds that they were unworkable, but now plans 
appear to be afoot to produce a new ground for rejecting such applications: that the marriage 
in question was ‘forced’, and hence ineligible as a vehicle for a spouse seeking entry into the 
UK.4  
 
As should by now be quite clear, the use of marriage as (amongst other things) a vehicle for 
facilitating the expansion and consolidation of transnational networks invariably has both an 
upside and a downside – although just how these are constituted, and the precise 
consequences which they may have for the individuals concerned differs enormously from 
context to context and from case to case.5 Yet although it is clearly essential that these 
downsides should be properly addressed, especially when they severely damage the interests 
of the individuals concerned, public policy initiatives which focus solely on the downsides, 
which fail to take sufficient account of the complex processes of inter-personal dynamics 
within the extended family which invariably lie behind cases of extreme distress can easily do 
far more harm than good, no matter how well intentioned the motives of the policy 
formulators may be. However all this becomes yet more disastrous is when a nominal 
                                                 
4 A Choice by Right: Report on the Working Group on Forced Marriage The Home Office 2004 
5  Unfortunately there has been no space to incorporate any detailed case studies in this article. However a 
running record of the homicide cases for which I have prepared expert reports can be found at 
http://www.art.man.ac.uk/casas/pdfpapers/homicide.pdf, which provide an opportunity to consider the precise 
circumstances in which a whole series of killings within South Asian families actually took place. Amongst 
other things these accounts serve to show how frequently such events were precipitated by a whole series of 
personal taunts, thane, between those involved, in an escalating cycle which eventually got wholly out of 
control. That honour, izzat, was an issue in such cycles of insults is quite clear; but very few of the homicides of 
which I have first-hand experience involve the kind of premeditated retribution which lies at heart of popular 
understandings of  ‘honour killing’; moreover in the small minority of cases which actually conformed to that 
model, all the victims in my sample were male, not female.  
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concern for human rights, and most especially for the rights of ‘oppressed women’ is used as 
a convenient veil behind which to conceal the true objectives of the whole exercise. The 
introduction of measures designed to exclude immigrants of non-European descent by means 
of a convenient surrogate: their use of unacceptable – and hence illegitimate – conventions of 
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